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 1 
Whole life sentences and article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: time for certainty and a common approach? 
 
Abstract Whether the law should reserve the power to impose a whole life sentence on an 
individual found guilty of murder in the most serious cases raises issues surrounding just 
punishment, public protection and a humane criminal justice system. The prospect of a prisoner 
being incarcerated for their whole life – as opposed to receiving a life sentence where they will be 
considered for release on license for life after a determined, or flexible term, begs the question 
whether such sentences are inconsistent with the liberty and dignity of the prisoner. In addition, 
there are two related questions: whether each individual state (within the Council of Europe) 
should be at liberty to promulgate and apply its own domestic rules in this area, or whether a 
supra national court – the European Court of Human Rights – should lay down common 
standards for all states, such rules being based on fundamental principles reflecting international 
human rights standards; and  the extent to which any relevant domestic laws have to provide the 
prisoner and the domestic authorities with sufficient guidance on what factors will be taken into 
account when any such review takes place.  These issues have been raised in a number of recent 
decisions – in both and the European Court of Human Rights and the UK domestic courts - and 
this article examines these cases and attempts to assess the extent to which the Convention, and 
the jurisprudence of the European Court, requires the regulation of domestic law with respect to 
the passing and review of such sentences.  
 
KEY WORDS: whole life sentences; review and release, inhuman and degrading 
punishment 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In July 2013 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights – in Vinter, 
Moore and Bamber v United Kingdom1 - held that the imposition of whole life sentences 
without review and the realistic possibility of release violates Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment. It also held that UK law was in violation of that article as it 
did not provide a sufficiently clear power to the national authorities to review such 
sentences and order the release of the prisoner.2 The Grand Chamber’s decision clarified 
both the position of whole life sentences within Article 3 and the various cases that had 
considered the challenge to the legality of such sentences. Prior to Vinter, the European 
Court had on a number of occasions considered whether the imposition of a whole life 
sentence would be contrary to Article 3: either because the sentence was excessive and 
arbitrary, or because there may be no safeguard of review. In Leger v France3 the Court 
held that very long sentences were not contrary to Article 3 provided they are supported 
                                                 
1 Application Nos. 66609/09; 130/10 and 3896; The Times, 11 July 2013. 
2 See Foster, S ‘Whole life sentences and the European Court of Human Rights: now life might not mean 
life’ (2013) 177 (30) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 505. For a detailed analysis of the decision in 
Vinter, see Dirk van Zyl Smit, Pete Weatherby and Simon Creighton ‘Whole Life Sentences and the Tide 
of European Human Rights Jurisprudence: What is to be done?’ (2014) 14(1) Human Rights Law Review 
59; and Szydlo, M ‘Free Life after Life Imprisonment as a Human Right under the European Convention’ 
(2013) 9(3) European Constitutional Law Review 501. 
3 Decision of the European Court of Human Rights 11 April 2006 
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on strong punitive grounds. In that case the Court accepted that a sentence of this nature 
necessarily entailed anxiety and uncertainty relating to prison life and life after release, 
but on the facts it found that there were no aggravating circumstances to conclude that the 
applicant had undergone an exceptional ordeal capable of constituting treatment contrary 
to article 3.4 
 
The specific issue of the review of such sentences was addressed by the European 
Court in Panayi (aka Kafkaris) v Cyprus,5 where it was held that the imposition of an 
indeterminate life sentence did not necessarily violate Article 3 (or Article 5 – 
guaranteeing protection against arbitrary deprivation of liberty). The Court stated that 
although the imposition of an irreducible life sentence could be inconsistent with Article 
3, this would only be the case where there was no hope, prospect or possibility of 
release.6 In that case, it found that although a whole life sentence was possible, there 
were provisions in domestic law for suspension and remission of the sentence. Thus, 
although such a sentence entailed a level of anxiety, given the possibilities of release it 
was not one which gave rise to a violation of Article 3.7 European Court jurisprudence 
thus appeared to outlaw the imposition of whole life sentences where there was no clear 
possibility of release, even where the initial whole life term was justified as proportionate 
                                                 
4 For  a discussion on very long and disproportionate sentences and their compatibility with article 3, see 
Rogan, M ‘The European Court of Human Rights, gross disproportionality and long prison sentences after 
Vinter v United Kingdom’ [2015] PL 22 
5 (2009) 49 EHRR 35 
6  Ibid, at paras 98-100  
 
7  Ibid, at paras 106-107 
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to the crime. However, the UK domestic courts were of the view that even an irreducible 
term could comply with the Convention and the Human Rights Act 1998. Thus, in R 
(Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 8 the House of Lords held 
that the threat of an imposition (by an American court) of a whole life sentence in lieu of 
the death penalty did not automatically violate Article 3, because although the prisoner 
was to be subjected to a blanket rule, in this case the punishment was by no means out of 
proportion to the gravity of the offence. In any case, their Lordships insisted that a life 
sentence under domestic law was not irreducible, following the decision in R v Bieber,9 
where it was held that a whole life term should not be construed as irreducible, and that 
any claim that such a sentence violated Article 3 should be made not at the time of the 
sentence’s imposition, but at a time when it is claimed that any further detention would 
be in breach of that article. Indeed the domestic courts had gone so far as to suggest that 
irreducible whole life sentences were not in violation of the Convention. Although the 
Wellington case, above was an extradition case, in R v Bamber,10 the Court of Appeal 
held that a whole life sentence for conviction of the murder of 5 people was justified as 
there was nothing in the Convention precluding the making of a whole life order where it 
represented appropriate punishment for extreme criminality. Further, In R v Oakes11 the 
Court of Appeal held that whole life sentences passed under domestic law were not in 
violation of Article 3 provided the sentencing court had reflected on mitigation properly 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 [2009] 1AC 335 
9 [2009] 1 WLR 223 
10 [2009] EWCA Crim 962 
11 [2012] EWCA Civ 2345 
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available to the defendant. In such a case, in the court’s view whole life orders imposed 
as a matter of judicial discretion as to the appropriate level of punishments and deterrence 
for a crime of utmost seriousness would not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Such an order was not prescriptive and was one of last resort, reserved for the few 
exceptionally serious offences for which after reflecting on all aggravation and 
mitigation, the judge was satisfied that just punishment required the imposition of a 
whole life sentence.12  
 
Following the decision of the Grand Chamber in Vinter, the UK Court of Appeal 
– in Re Attorney-General’s Reference (No 69 of 2013); R v McLoughlin and R v Newel 13 
- found that UK law did in fact provide such a power to review and release and 
accordingly held that domestic law was in compliance with both Article 3 and the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment in Vinter. Although a subsequent decision of the European Court 
involving a Hungarian prisoner has re-iterated the need for clarity with respect to such 
                                                 
12 On the other hand, the Privy Council have followed European jurisprudence, and in Boucherville v 
Mauritius ([2008] UKPC 37) it held that a mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life was akin to a death 
sentence and thus breached the constitution, drawing the distinction between this case and Kafkaris, above, 
and finding that the lack of release possibilities made the sentence arbitrary and disproportionate as well as 
inhuman and degrading. 
13 [2014] EWCA Crim 188; [2014] HRLR 7. See Ashworth, A ‘Case Comment’ [2014) Crim Law 471; 
Foster, S ‘Whole life sentences: resolving the conflict (2014) 178 (10) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 
138 
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legal provisions and their compatibility with Article 3,14 thus casting doubt on the Court 
of Appeal’s decision that UK law was consistent with the Convention and its case law, 
the Court of Appeal’ decision has been accepted by a more recent decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights.15 This article will analyse those cases to examine the 
extent to which international human rights law insists on minimum rules relating to the 
review and possible release of such prisoners, and how such rules can be reconciled with 
each member state’s prerogative to promulgate its own laws in this controversial and 
sensitive area. In particular, in the light of the most recent decision of the European 
Court, the article will assess whether UK law, and indeed the most decision, are 
consistent with the principles of legality and certainty that were stressed by the Grand 
chamber in Vinter. Such an analysis is especially pertinent given the concerns of many 
member states regarding the power of the European Court to interfere with domestic law 
in areas which impact on Convention rights and general principles of international human 
rights law.16 The article concludes that whilst the European Court is prepared to give each 
member state a wide margin of appreciation with respect to the passing of such sentences, 
and the manner and regularity in which they are reviewed, it is, correctly, not prepared to 
allow member states to depart from fundamental principles of legality, certainty and 
                                                 
14 László Magyar v Hungary, Application No. 73593/10, decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
20 May 2014. 
15 Hutchinson v United Kingdom, Application No. 57592/08, decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights 3 February 2015. See Foster ‘All Right Now? (2015) ** Criminal Law and Justice Weekly **. The 
decision in Hutchinson has now been appealed to the Grand chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the effect of that appeal is considered in the conclusion, below. 
16 See Elliot, M ‘After Brighton; between a rock and a hard place’ [2013] PL 619 
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proportionality when making provision for such sentences and their review. However, the 
article will also note that the most recent decision of the European Court has 
misinterpreted the wording and spirit of Vinter, and will contribute to create uncertainty 
for the prisoner and the domestic judiciary with respect to the rules on review and release 
of life sentence prisoners. 
 
THE DECISION OF THE GRAND CHAMBER IN VINTER MOORE AND BAMBER 
V UNITED KINGDOM 
 
This decision is at the centre of the compatibility of whole life sentences with Article 3 of 
the European Convention – which provides that no one shall be subject to torture, or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Thus, all domestic law must comply with 
the basic principles laid down in this judgment, although, as we shall see the Grand 
Chamber allow some level of discretion with respect to the domestic law and how it 
regulates such sentences and their review.17 
 
In Vinter three prisoners had been given whole life terms for murder, imposed by the trial 
judge under s.269 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Before this Act was passed, the 
Home Secretary could expressly review such sentences after 25 years, but the 2003 Act 
removed the executive role with respect to these sentences so as to comply with the 
                                                 
17  For a comprehensive coverage of the case, see van Zyl Smit, D, Weatherby, P and Creighton, S 
‘Whole life sentences and the tide of European human rights jurisprudence: what is to be done?’ (2014) 
14(1) Human Rights Law Review 59 
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European Court’s decision in Stafford v United Kingdom,18 which held that such 
executive involvement in the sentencing and review process was contrary to Article 5 of 
the Convention; but the 2003 Act did not provide expressly for any judicial or other 
review.  
 
The prisoners in Vinter claimed that such sentences were in breach of Article 3, as 
they imposed a whole life sentence on each prisoner without the possibility of review or 
release and thus constituted inhuman treatment and punishment. In January 2012 the 
European Court of Human Rights rejected their claims,19 believing that the sentences 
served a sound penological purpose and were proportionate and just in the circumstances, 
and that the prisoners had failed to show that their present detention was inhuman as they 
had only recently had their sentences imposed and appealed.  
 
The prisoners appealed to the Grand Chamber of the European Court, which held that 
even though there was no argument that the sentences imposed on the applicants in this 
case were disproportionate, for a life sentence to be compatible with Article 3 that 
sentence had to offer both a possibility of release and a possibility of review.20 
Considering the compatibility of UK law with that principle, it noted that the large 
majority of Member States in the Council of Europe either did not impose life sentences 
at all, or, if they did, provided some form of mechanism guaranteeing a review of that 
                                                 
18 (2002) 35 EHRR 32 
19 (2012) 55 EHRR 34 
20 ibid, at para 119 
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sentence after a set period, usually after 25 years of imprisonment.21 Further, the Grand 
Chamber noted that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides for a 
review of such sentences after 25 years and periodic reviews thereafter. Thus, although it 
was for each Member State to decide when such a review took place, comparative and 
international data showed clear support for a mechanism guaranteeing review no later 
than 25 years after the sentence.22 
 
The Grand Chamber reached its conclusion regarding Article 3 on several 
grounds. First, that after a period of time the causal link between detention and sound 
penal reasons for imprisonment eroded or was capable of change; although sentences are 
imposed partly for punishment, retribution and deterrence, they should also reflect the 
principle of rehabilitation, as many state’s criminal justice systems did these days.23 
Secondly, the whole life term offered no possibility of atonement on behalf of the 
prisoner and thus did not guarantee just punishment.24 Thirdly, such a sentence was 
contrary to the human dignity of the individual, leaving the prisoner in a constant state of 
anxiety in that they have to live with no possibility of release.25 Explaining that decision 
in the light of Article 3, Syzdlo comments that ‘the continued detention of a life prisoner, 
who has possibly spent many years or decades in prison, and whose future detention is no 
                                                 
 
21 ibid, at para 117 
 
22 ibid, at para 118 
 
23 ibid, at para 111 
 
24  ibid at para 112 
 
25 ibid at para 113 
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longer justified by an y penological grounds, is clearly the manifestation of an inhuman 
punishment…because the prisoner is then treated purely instrumentally.’26 
 
With respect to the claims in the present case, the Grand Chamber rejected the 
government’s argument that a review was no longer possible as the European Court had 
forbidden executive involvement in such processes; in its view the 2003 Act could quite 
easily have included a judicial review to replace the previous executive one.27 It also 
noted that the 2003 Act was incompatible with Article 3, despite the government’s pleas 
that with a human rights-friendly interpretation the provision allowing release in 
exceptional circumstances on compassionate grounds - s.30 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 
- was capable of being extended to other reasons for release, including rehabilitation. The 
Grand Chamber rejected that interpretation because the relevant Prison Service Order  - 
PSO 4700 Chapter 12 - made it clear that that release was confined to illness, where the 
prisoner was effectively released to die.28 Accordingly, the Grand Chamber found a 
violation of Article 3, although it stressed that such a finding did not give any of the 
applicants the prospect of immediate release: whether they should be released would 
depend on whether there were still sound penological reasons for their continued 
detention and whether they should continue to be detained be detained on grounds of 
dangerousness.29 
                                                 
26 Szydlo, M ‘Free Life after Life Imprisonment as a Human Right under the European Convention’ (2013)  
9 European Constitutional Law Review 501, at 508 
 
27  ibid, at  para 124 
 
28  ibid, at paras 126-128 
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As noted above, the Grand Chamber’s decision clarified both the position of 
whole life sentences vis a vis Article 3 and the various cases that had considered the 
challenge to the legality of such sentences. Aside from the clear inconsistency between 
European and domestic jurisprudence in this area, the Grand Chamber’s decision 
expanded the European Court’s case law by allowing the Court to judge the compatibility 
of such sentences at their inception, rather than waiting until refusal of release at a later 
stage of incarceration. Thus, in the Court’s first judgment in Vinter, Moore and Bamber v 
United Kingdom, it was held that the imposition of whole a life sentence on three 
prisoners was not in breach of Article 3 because the sentences were proportionate in the 
circumstances and the compatibility of a whole life sentence (without parole) was not to 
be judged at the time of the sentence but at a later date if and when the prisoners were 
being detained without justification. This rationale was subsequently approved in Babar 
Ahmed and others v United Kingdom,30 where the European Court held that the 
extradition of a number of individuals to the USA to serve whole life sentences in high 
security prisons would not violate Article 3. Although the Court accepted that whole life 
sentences without review could be disproportionate and inhuman, and needed particularly 
robust review if part of a mandatory sentence, the sentences were proportionately handed 
down, and the appropriate time to assess them in the context of article 3 would be when 
                                                                                                                                                 
29  ibid, at paras 130-131 
 
30 (2013) 56 EHRR 1 
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the prisoners were no longer a risk, and not at the time of the imposition of the sentence, 
or at the time of extradition.31 
 
The Grand Chamber’s decision in Vinter, whilst not prescribing particular forms 
of review necessary to comply with Article 3, clearly states that the imposition of a whole 
life sentence without the safeguard of sufficiently clear rules on future review and release 
will constitute inhuman punishment and thus be in breach of Article 3: 
 
‘…a whole life prisoner should not be obliged to wait and serve an 
indeterminate number of years of his sentence before he can raise the 
complaint that the legal conditions attaching to his sentence fail to comply 
with the requirements of Article 3 in this regard. This would be contrary to 
both legal certainty and to the general principles on victim status within 
Article 34…Furthermore, in cases where the sentence on imposition, is 
irreducible under domestic law, it would be capricious to expect the 
prisoner wo work towards his own rehabilitation without knowing 
whether, at an unspecified, future date, a mechanism might be introduced 
which would allow him, on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be 
                                                 
31 Ibid at para 243. In Trabesli v Belgium, Application No. 140/10, decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights 4 September 2014, the European Court rejected the government’s plea that the risk of any 
violation of Article 3, and the principles in Vinter, had to be assessed at least after the applicant had been 
extradited and convicted. In the Court’s view, the risk had to be assessed before a person suffered a penalty 
of a level of severity that was proscribed by Article 3, in other words before the applicant’s possible 
conviction in the United States of terrorist charges. 
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considered for release. A whole life prisoner is entitled to know, at the 
outset of his sentence, what he must do to be considered for release and 
under what conditions, including when a review of his sentence will take 
place or may be sought.’32 
 
Thus, it is no longer necessary to for a court to wait until the time that the prisoner 
can realistically show that they are no longer a risk to the public and show sufficient 
atonement for their actions; hope should be given at the outset of the sentence and the 
current judgment takes into account the human dignity of the prisoner and not just 
possibility of the arbitrary nature of their continued detention.  
 
The decision of the Grand Chamber in Vinter has been approved in a number of 
cases, including László Magyar v Hungary,33 detailed below. In addition, in Ocalan v 
Turkey,34 the European Court not only makes it clear that the rules on release must be 
clearly formulated and foreseeable at the outset, but that there is a clear distinction 
between the prospect of release, as required by Vinter, and release on compassionate 
grounds. In this case, Öcalan had initially been sentenced to death for particularly serious 
crimes, but following the abolition by Turkey of the death penalty in peacetime his 
sentence was then commuted to an “aggravated” life sentence. Under the new Turkish 
                                                 
32 Vinter v United Kingdom at para. 122 
 
33 Application No. 73593/10, decision of the European Court of Human Rights 20 May 2014 
 
34 Application Nos. 24069/03; 197/04; 6201/06; 10464/07, decision of the European Court 18 March 2014; 
the judgment is only available in French. 
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Criminal Code, that sentence meant that the convicted person would remain in prison for 
the rest of his life, regardless of any consideration as to the person’s dangerousness or 
any possibility of conditional release, even after a certain term of imprisonment.  Thus, the 
European Court noted that whilst it was true that under Turkish law the President of the Republic 
was entitled to order the release of a person imprisoned for life who was elderly or ill, that was 
release on compassionate grounds, which different from the notion of “prospect of release.” 
 
THE RESPONSE OF THE UK COURTS: THE DECISION IN RE ATTORNEY-
GENERAL’S REFERENCE (NO 69 OF 2013); R V McLOUGHLIN AND R V 
NEWELL  
 
Following the decision of the Grand Chamber in Vinter, the domestic courts had to 
consider the compatibility of such sentences with Article 3 and the Human Rights Act 
1998, hopefully clarifying both the relevant domestic law and its relationship with the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights.35 The Court of Appeal case was 
brought in response to concerns about the legality of whole life sentences and in August 
2013, triple murderer Arthur Hutchinson appealed to the European Court of Human 
Rights against a whole life tariff following the ruling in Vinter.36 
 
                                                 
35 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 69 of 2013); R v McLoughlin and Newell [2014] HRLR 7 
 
36 See ‘Triple murderer Arthur Hutchinson mounts first whole-life tariff appeal’, The Times, August 
22, 2013, Law. As we shall see, the European Court rejected Hutchinson’s claim that his sentence was 
incompatible with Article 3 and Vinter: Hutchinson v United Kingdom Application No. 57592/08, decision 
of the European Court of Human Rights 3 February 2015. 
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In the first of conjoined appeals the Attorney-General referred to the court as 
unduly lenient a minimum term of 40 years which had been passed on M following a plea 
of guilty for murder; the judge being reluctant to impose a whole  life sentence because of 
the ruling in Vinter, above. In the second case, N appealed against his whole life sentence 
on the grounds that such sentences were now incompatible with Article 3 and the ruling 
in Vinter. The power to impose such sentences is contained in s.269 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2013 and under s.30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 the Secretary of State 
has the power, in exceptional circumstances, to order the release of such a prisoner on 
compassionate grounds. The Court of Appeal was thus asked to determine whether that 
legislative scheme was compatible with Article 3 and the relevant case law of the 
European Court of human rights, which, under s.2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 the 
domestic courts must take into account in domestic proceedings involving the 
determination of Convention rights. 
 
The Court of Appeal held firstly that there were some crimes that were so heinous 
that Parliament was entitled to feel that a whole life order should be imposed; such a 
sentence was not incompatible with Article 3 and the Grand Chamber’s judgment in 
Vinter did not dispute that. According to the Court of Appeal, although there may be a 
dispute about which crimes warranted such an order, the state would be allowed a certain 
margin of appreciation in making that decision.37 Thus, Vinter did not question the 
validity of whole life orders in appropriate cases; rather it insisted that such a sentence 
without the prospect of review and release would be contrary to Article 3 as it would 
                                                 
37  ibid, at para 17 
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involve the prisoner in being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. Further, it is 
essential that a system of review exists at the time that the sentence is passed.38 
 
The Court of Appeal then stated that even if the Grand Chamber had outlawed 
whole life sentences, the domestic courts could not use s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
– allowing domestic courts to interpret legislation, wherever possible, to achieve 
compatibility with Convention rights – to read down the clear words of s.269 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. The question, therefore, was whether a declaration of 
incompatibility should be issued by the present court, and whether the release procedures 
under s.30 of the 1997 Act –‘exceptional circumstances justifying release on 
compassionate grounds’ - were sufficiently clear to provide an adequate remedy to those 
who should be released in the circumstances envisaged by the Grand Chamber.39 
 
It was at this point that the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Grand Chamber. 
The Grand Chamber had found that s.30 was not capable of being extended to reasons 
other than illness, including rehabilitation; because relevant Prison Service Order (PSO 
4700 Chapter 12) made it clear that that release was confined to illness, where the 
prisoner was effectively released to die. In the Court of Appeal’s view, the secretary was 
bound to use his release powers in a manner that was compatible with Article 3, and in 
particular interpret the words ‘compassionate grounds’ in such a manner.40 It was not 
                                                 
 
38  ibid, at para 20 
 
39  ibid at paras 23-25 
 
40  Ibid, at paras 29-35 
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necessary to specify what those circumstances are, and as Article 3 had to be interpreted 
in accordance with s.3 of the 1998 Act it was entirely consistent with the rule of law that 
applications were to be considered on an individual basis against the criteria that 
circumstances had changed to such an extent that the punishment was no longer 
justifiable.41 
 
With respect to the consistency of UK law with the Convention, The Court of 
Appeal noted that although a violation of Article 3 was established in Vinter, the Grand 
Chamber stressed that such a finding did not give any of the applicants the prospect of 
immediate release, and that whether they should be released would depend on whether 
there were still sound penological reasons for their continued detention and whether they 
should continue to be detained be detained on grounds of dangerousness. In that respect, 
therefore, the Court of Appeal’s decision appears to be in line with the Grand Chamber’s 
judgment, despite there being a lack of formal process to check on the imposition of 
potentially arbitrary whole life sentences. 
                                                 
 
41 Ibid, at para 36 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the judge in M had clearly erred in not 
making a whole life order because he felt such an order was not consistent with article 3 or Vinter. In that 
case, and taking into account that it was M’s second murder and committed on conditional release from 
prison; see also ‘Killer who struck again on day release avoids life sentence,’ The Times, 22 October 2013), 
the case was so serious that the punishment required a whole life sentence. The Court of Appeal also held 
that the trial judge had been entitled to impose a whole life sentence in N’s case – his second murder, 
committed whilst he was in prison serving a life sentence, and there being no mitigation.  
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As noted above, the Grand Chamber rejected the government’s pleas that with a 
human rights-friendly interpretation the provision allowing release on medical grounds 
(s. 30 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997) was capable of being extended to other reasons for 
release, including rehabilitation. In the Court of Appeal’s view such a provision was 
capable of extending to other circumstances of covering cases where the prisoner has 
rehabilitated to such an extent that further detention would not be compatible with Article 
3 or just sentences. Thus, compatibility may have been achieved indirectly: although the 
Grand Chamber indicated that a formal system of release should be evident at the time of 
sentence – with a provision that allows a review within 25 years – the liberal 
interpretation and use of s.30 could satisfy the Grand Chamber; provided subsequent 
Ministers are prepared to apply it in an equally liberal fashion. 
 
The Court of Appeal thus managed to avoid a conflict between the decisions of 
the European Court and the domestic courts by its, not very convincing, interpretation of 
s.30 of the 1997 Act. Thus, although it was not possible to interpret the whole life powers 
of the secretary under the 2003 Act by using s.3 of the Human Rights Act, it was possible 
to extend the apparent scope of s.30 to comply with the tenor of the Grand Chamber’s 
judgment. It is submitted that this is, in many ways, an unsatisfactory solution to the 
problem. It is quite clear that Parliament and the executive did not intend s.30 to apply 
much beyond the exceptional case where a prisoner is released to die because of serious 
and life-threatening illness. What the prisoner is now being asked to believe is that at the 
appropriate time they will be considered for release on other grounds relating to 
 19 
rehabilitation and the injustice of detention that no longer serves a legitimate or humane 
purpose. It is submitted that a more logical and legitimate step would have been for the 
Court of Appeal to declare the current scheme unclear and incompatible with Article 3 
and for Parliament to put into place a process that would comply with the tenor of the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment. By not taking this step it was felt that the Court of Appeal 
was storing up trouble, awaiting inevitable applications under the European Convention 
by prisoners who will still be unclear when and if they are ever to be released. Indeed, in 
its recent report on the legislative scrutiny of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2014, 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in commenting on the proposal to increase 
sentences for terrorist related offences, noted that although the Court of Appeal in 
McLoughlin brought welcome clarification of the legal position concerning “whole life 
orders”, it believed that, in view of the legal uncertainty that remains about the 
availability of a review mechanism for such orders, more specific details need to be 
provided about this mechanism, including the timetable on which such a review can be 
sought, the grounds on which it can be sought, who should conduct such a review, and 
the periodic availability of further such reviews after the first review.  The Committee 
then added that the current Bill provided an opportunity for Parliament to remove any 
legal uncertainty by specifying the details of the review mechanism, and that an 
amendment be added to the Bill to give Parliament the opportunity to debate the 
desirability of amending the statutory framework to put beyond legal doubt the 
availability of this mechanism, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.42 Despite 
                                                 
42 House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights  Legislative Scrutiny (1) 
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill; (2) Deregulation Bill, fourteenth report of session 2013-2014, at 
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the recent affirmation of the Court Of Appeal’s decision in Hutchinson, below, the 
Committee’s concerns are also be borne out by decision in Mayar v Hungary, below, 
which gives further guidance on the requirements of certainty with respect to the prospect 
of the review of such sentences and any release of the prisoners and which will now be 
examined. 
 
THE DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT IN LASSZLO MAGAY V HUNGARY 
AND RELATED CASES 
 
The applicant was detained at Steged Prison in Hungary having been sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole for murder, burglary and other offences; the offences in 
question were connected with a series of burglaries and assaults against a number of 
elderly victims. A life sentence was awarded because the applicant was considered a 
multiple recidivist. The applicant claimed that his sentence constituted inhuman and 
degrading punishment under Article 3; he also asserted that there had been a breach of 
Article 6 because of the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against him. 
 
In deciding whether there was a violation of Article 3 the European Court 
acknowledged that under the Convention those convicted of a serious crime could be 
sentenced to indeterminate detention where such a sentence was necessary for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
paragraph 1.26 
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protection of the public, provided the sentence is in some way irreducible.43 Further, it 
held that a life sentence does not become irreducible by the mere fact that in practice it 
may be served in full; thus no issue arises under Article 3 if a life sentence is de iure and 
de facto reducible,44 and no such issue could arise if, for example, a life prisoner had the 
right under domestic law to be considered for release but this was refused on the ground 
that he or she continued to pose a danger to society. This was because States have a duty 
under the Convention to take measures for the protection of the public from violent crime 
and the Convention does not prohibit them from subjecting a person convicted of a 
serious crime to an indeterminate sentence, allowing for the offender’s continued 
detention where necessary for the protection of the public.45 This was particularly so for 
those convicted of murder or other serious offences against the person, and the mere fact 
that such prisoners may already have served a long period of imprisonment did not 
weaken the State’s positive obligation in that respect; they may fulfil that obligation by 
continuing to detain such life sentenced prisoners for as long as they remain dangerous.46 
 
However, the Court then stressed that Article 3 had to be interpreted as requiring 
reducibility of that sentence, where national authorities should be allowed to review life 
sentences in order to assess whether the prisoner had made such significant progress 
                                                 
43 László Magyar v Hungary, Application No. 73593/10, decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
20 May 2014, at paras 46-47  
 
44 ibid, at para 49 Applying Kafkaris v Cyprus, note 7 above 
45 ibid, citing T and V v United Kingdom  (2000) 30 EHRR 121 
46 ibid 
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towards rehabilitation that their continued detention could no longer be justified.47 
Further, the Court stated that the prisoner should be entitled to know, from the beginning 
of their sentence, what they had to do to be considered for release and under what 
conditions.  Thus, with respect to the timing of a prisoner’s challenge, it stated that 
although the requisite review is a prospective event necessarily subsequent to the passing 
of the sentence, a whole life prisoner should not be obliged to wait and serve an 
indeterminate number of years of his sentence before he can raise the complaint that the 
legal conditions attaching to his sentence fail to comply with Article 3. This, in the 
Court’s view, would be contrary both to legal certainty and to the general principles on 
victim status within Article 34, which guarantees access to the Court.48 Further, in cases 
where the sentence, on imposition, is irreducible under domestic law, it would be 
capricious to expect the prisoner to work towards his own rehabilitation without knowing 
whether, at an unspecified, future date, a mechanism might be introduced which would 
allow him, on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be considered for release. A whole life 
prisoner thus is entitled to know, at the outset of his sentence, what he must do to be 
considered for release and under what conditions, including when a review of his 
sentence will take place or may be sought.49 
 
Thus, following Vinter, in determining whether a life sentence in a given case can 
be regarded as irreducible, the Court will seek to ascertain whether a life prisoner can be 
                                                 
 
47  ibid, at para 50 
 
48  ibid, at para 53 
 
49  ibid 
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said to have any prospect of release, and where national law affords the possibility of 
review of a life sentence with a view to its commutation, remission, termination or the 
conditional release of the prisoner, whether this is sufficient to satisfy Article 3. It 
followed, therefore, that where domestic law does not provide for the possibility of such a 
review, a whole life sentence will not measure up to the standards of Article 3. Despite 
that principle, the Court reiterated that, having regard to the margin of appreciation which 
must be accorded to Contracting States in matters of criminal justice and sentencing, it 
was not its task to prescribe the form - whether executive or judicial - which that review 
should take; and for the same reason, it was not for the Court to determine when that 
review should take place. 
 
The Court then turned its attention to whether, in all the circumstances, the 
applicant’s whole life order met the requirements of Article 3. Under Hungarian law, 
those sentenced to life imprisonment without parole could submit, via the Ministry of 
Justice, a request for a pardon to the President of the Republic via s. 597(5) of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. Although the Court did not appear to exclude the possible legality 
of presidential clemency, it ruled that the relevant domestic law did not comply with 
Article 3 or the principles established in Kafkaris and, more recently, in Vinter. It noted 
first, that the relevant regulations did not oblige the authorities or the President of the 
Republic to assess, whenever a prisoner requests a pardon, whether his or her continued 
imprisonment is justified on legitimate penological grounds. Although the Court noted 
that the authorities had a general duty to collect information about the prisoner and to 
enclose it with the pardon request, the law did not provide for any specific guidance as to 
 24 
what kind of criteria or conditions was to be taken into account in the gathering and 
organisation of such personal particulars and in the assessment of the request. Further, 
neither the Minister of Justice nor the President of the Republic was bound to give 
reasons for the decisions concerning such requests. In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court took into consideration its previous decision in Törköly v Hungary,50 where the 
relevant domestic law on parole was upheld by the Court. However, the Court noted that 
the present case was substantially different from Törköly, because in that case the 
applicant’s eligibility for release on parole from his life sentence was not excluded. Thus, 
in Törköly, it was in great part that distant but real possibility for release which led the 
Court to consider that the applicant had not been deprived of all hope of being released 
from prison one day. Although in Törköly the Court took into account that the applicant 
might be granted presidential clemency, the present case, where the applicant’s eligibility 
for release on parole was excluded, a stricter scrutiny of the regulation and practice of 
presidential clemency was required.51 
Accordingly, the Court was not persuaded that the institution of presidential 
clemency, taken alone (without being complemented by the eligibility for release on 
parole) and as its regulation presently stands, would allow any prisoner to know what he 
or she must do to be considered for release and under what conditions. In the Court’s 
view, the regulation did not guarantee a proper consideration of the changes and the 
progress towards rehabilitation made by the prisoner, however significant they might 
                                                 
50 Application No 4413/06; decision of the European Court 5 April 2011 
51 László Magyar v Hungary , at para 56 
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be.52 The Court thus found a violation of Article 3, although, as in the Grand Chamber’s 
decision in Vinter, it stressed that, in the course of the present proceedings, the applicant 
had not argued that, in his individual case, there are no longer any legitimate penological 
grounds for his continued detention, and that a finding of a violation under Article 3 
could not be understood as giving him the prospect of imminent release.53 
 
This rationale has also been applied in the case of Ocalan v Turkey,54 where the 
European Court found a violation of article 3 with regards to the applicant’s sentence to 
life imprisonment with no possibility of release on parole. In this case the applicant had 
been sentenced to death in June 1999 after the Ankara State Security Court held that he 
was the founder and leader of the Kurdish separatist organisation known as the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) and convicted him of leading a group of armed terrorists with the 
aim of bringing about the secession of part of Turkish territory. On the abolition of the 
death penalty in peacetime in 2002, this sentence was commuted to a whole life term with 
no possibility of release on parole - an "aggravated life sentence." Confirming that 
national law must provide the possibility of release on parole, or of a review to the end of 
commuting, suspending or ending the sentence, the Court noted that the prisoner in this 
case would remain in prison for the rest of his life, regardless of any fresh consideration 
of the threat that he posed and without any prospect of release on parole. Although the 
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Court conceded that the Turkish President had the power to release a prisoner on 
compassionate grounds in cases of illness or old age, release for such humanitarian 
reasons was not equivalent to the "prospect of release" required by Vinter. The Court 
acknowledged that the Turkish legislature had passed general or partial amnesties from 
time to time. However, it had not been demonstrated that there was any such proposal in 
relation to the applicant.55 
 
The more recent decision in Trabelsi v Belgium56 further re-iterates the requirement that 
the prospect of release must be a realistic one, so that the sentence is reducible both de 
jure and de facto. In this case, a Tunisian national who had been sentenced by a Belgian 
court to ten year’s imprisonment for attempting to blow up a military base was the 
subject of an extradition request by the United States government to face charges with 
respect to offences relating to Al-Qaeda inspired acts of terrorism. The Belgian 
authorities sought assurances form the US authorities that that the death penalty would 
not be imposed on him, or that any life sentence should be accompanied by the possibility 
of commutation of that sentence. Such assurances were given and the extradition request 
was granted. 
                                                 
55 Rejecting the government’s argument that the applicant had been imprisoned for life because he was the 
author of particularly serious terrorist crimes, the Court recalled that the Convention did not permit 
derogation from art.3 in any circumstances. The Court emphasised that its finding should not be interpreted 
as providing the applicant with a prospect of imminent release. Rather, it obliged the Turkish government 
to amend the law to set in place a procedure which provided after a certain minimum period of time for a 
compulsory assessment of whether the applicant’s detention could still be justified. 
 
56 Application No. 140/10, decision of the European Court of Human Rights 4 September 2014 
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In deciding that his extradition was incompatible with Article 3 and the judgment in 
Vinter, the European Court noted that even if the assurances from the US had been 
sufficiently precise,57 none of the procedures provided by US law to consider and allow 
early release amounted to a review mechanism which required the national authorities to 
ascertain, on the basis of objective, pre-established criteria of which the prisoner had 
precise cognisance at the time of the imposition of the life sentence (italics added), 
whether, while serving his sentence, the prisoner had changed and progressed to such an 
extent that continued detention could no longer be justified on legitimate oenological 
grounds.58 
 
THE DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT IN HUTCHINSON V UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Since the decision of the UK Court of Appeal in McCloughlin and Newell, the European 
Court of Human Rights has given its judgment in Hutchinson v United Kingdom.59 In this 
case the European Court was satisfied that the UK Court of Appeal had clarified the 
                                                 
57 The Court in fact found that such assurances were too general to pass that test; at paragraph 135. 
58 Trabelsi v Belgium, at paragraph 137. Subsequently, the UK High Court refused to stay the extradition of 
an individual who was to be extradited to the US to face terrorist charges on grounds that he would face a 
non-reducible life sentence: R (Harkins) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 309 
(Admin). The High Court stated that the decision in Trabelsi did not advance the principles in Vinter apart 
from applying them to the context of extradition, and that it was not obliged to follow that decision. 
59 Application No. 57592/08, decision of the European Court of Human Rights 3 February 2015. 
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power of release in domestic legislation to a sufficient extent so as to comply with the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment in Vinter. 
 
In this case Hutchinson had been convicted of aggravated burglary, rape and three counts 
of murder in 1984 and was given a life sentence with a minimum tariff of 18 years set by 
the trial judge. The Secretary of State then informed him that he had decided to impose a 
whole life sentence and in 2008 the High Court, and then the Court of Appeal dismissed 
the prisoner’s appeal against that sentence.60 Hutchinson then made an application to the 
European Court of Human Rights, alleging that that the sentence amounted to inhuman 
and degrading treatment under Article 3 as the sentence offered no prospect of release. In 
particular, he argued that as the Grand Chamber in Vinter had found that domestic law 
did not clearly provide for review and possible release on grounds of rehabilitation, then 
his sentence was inconsistent with Article 3 and the Grand Chamber’s judgment. The 
government, on the other hand, argued that following the Court of Appeal decision that it 
was now clear that such sentences were open to review and thus compatible with Article 
3 and Vinter. 
 
After summarizing the general principles established by the European Court with respect 
to the compatibility of whole life sentences with Article 3, the Court then considered 
whether the secretary of state’s discretion under s. 30 of the 2003 Act was sufficient to 
make the whole life sentence imposed on the applicant legally and effectively reducible. 
Having noted that the Grand Chamber in Vinter had decided that the statutory power 
                                                 
60 See Hutchinson [2008] EWHC 860 QB  and Hutchinson  
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could not be interpreted to cover release on grounds of rehabilitation, and that the Lifer 
Manual that gave guidance on review had not been amended since Vinter, the European 
Court nevertheless noted that subsequently the UK Court of Appeal had established that 
the secretary was bound to use the power in a manner that was compatible with Article 
3.61 Thus, in the Court’s view if an offender subject to a whole life order could establish 
that ‘exceptional circumstances’ had arisen subsequent to the sentence, the secretary of 
state had to consider whether such circumstances justified release on compassionate 
grounds. Regardless of the policy set out in the Lifer Manual, the secretary had to 
consider all the relevant circumstances, in a manner compatible with Article 3.62 Further, 
any decision by the Secretary would have to be reasoned by reference to the 
circumstances of each case and would be subject to judicial review, which would serve to 
elucidate the meaning of the terms ‘exceptional circumstances’ and compassionate 
grounds, as was the usual practice under the common law.63 
The European Court then recalled that it was primarily for the national authorities, 
notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation,64 before 
deciding that where in the circumstances of the case, the national court had, following the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment in Vinter addressed the doubts of the Grand Chamber and set 
out an unequivocal statement of the legal position, the European Court must accept the 
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national court’s interpretation of domestic law.65 Accordingly the Court found no breach 
of Article 3 in the present case. 
With due respect, the Court’s judgment in Hutchinson is flawed in its 
interpretation and understanding of both the Vinter judgment and the principles of legal 
certainty upon which the Grand Chamber based its judgment.  As the dissenting judge – 
Judge Kalaydjieva - correctly notes, the question was not whether the European Court 
must accept the national court’s interpretation of the domestic law as clarified in the 
process of progressive development of the law through judicial interpretation. Rather it 
was whether or not in 2008 the applicant was entitled to know - at the outset of his 
sentence - what he must do to be considered for release and under what conditions, 
including when a review of his sentences will take place or may be sought.66   
 
Those requirements were the crux of the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Vinter, 
and as the dissenting judge states such questions have not been addressed or answered by 
the Court of Appeal or the government. Further, to say that the secretary’s executive 
power must be carried out in compliance with Article 3 and the principles established in 
Vinter, and that such discretion would be subject to judicial review which would 
elucidate the meaning of the relevant terms in the statute, does nothing to give the 
prisoner a clear idea, at the time of the sentence, of what criteria will be used and what he 
should be working towards in the forthcoming years of detention. At the very best, that 
will, or may become clear when the court reviews a number of cases and builds a clear 
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jurisprudence in this area. The European Court in Hutchinson, therefore, should have 
found that the failure to amend the statutory provision, or even the Lifer Manual, was 
fatal to the government’s claim that it had complied with the judgment in Vinter. Finally, 
although the Grand Chamber did not regard a review after twenty five years as 
mandatory, leaving the state to decide that issue within its margin of appreciation, surely 
a the prisoner is entitled to know the earliest time that his release can be reviewed. That 
aspect of the statutory scheme, as with most of the process, remains a mystery.67 
 
WHOLE LIFE SENTENCES AND THE PROPER ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The Grand Chamber’s decision in Vinter is to be welcomed for its clarification on the 
issue of when a human rights challenge to the effects of a life sentence can be mounted. 
Thus, after Vinter it is quite clear that a prisoner is entitled to ask the courts – domestic or 
European - to make a decision on the compatibility of the review mechanisms of such 
sentences at any stage, including at the outset, and do not have to wait for the sentence to 
reach the point where it would be inhuman to continue with detention at that stage. The 
Grand Chamber and the European Court has stressed that the rule of law and the 
requirement of certainty should allow the prisoner to predict the circumstances under 
which he may be released in the future, and that such circumstances should be 
promulgated with sufficient certainty in domestic legislation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
66 Hutchinson v United Kingdom, dissenting opinion of Judge Kalaydjieva. 
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Following the recent decision in Magyar, it is clear that although the review and 
release procedures can take various forms, and do not have to involve pure judicial input, 
any executive or other discretion surrounding review must be couched in sufficiently 
clear terms. More specifically, the criteria for review and the measures that the prisoner 
needs to satisfy for release, must be clear from the outset. In this respect, despite the 
recent affirmation of such provisions by the European Court in Hutchinson, it has to be 
doubted whether the current provisions in UK domestic law – felt by the Grand Chamber 
to be restricted to release on compassionate grounds relating to illness – are sufficiently 
clear to satisfy the European Court’s jurisprudence, including the most recent decisions in 
Magyar Ocalan and Trabelsi.  On inspection of those cases, and the provisions which 
were declared inadequate by the Court, it is predictable that the lack of reference to 
penological reasons for release in the UK regulations will result in Hutchinson appealing 
to the Grand Chamber and for that Court to rule in favour of challenges made by 
prisoners who are serving such sentences, and who wish to know their realistic prospects 
of release in the future. 
 
Aside from the specific criminal justice issues raised by such sentences and their 
review, this recent case, together with the other judgments of the Court and Grand 
Chamber, provides an interesting case study of the power and role of the European Court 
of Human Rights, together with its diplomatic and legal restrictions. The role of the Court 
(under Article 19 of the Convention) is to ensure the observance of the European 
Convention by the member states. This it does, of course, only when determining an 
application made by the victim against a member state; the Court’s role is judicial and it 
                                                                                                                                                 
67 As noted in the conclusion, the case has been referred to the Grand Chamber of the European Court. 
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has no power to rule on an issue in abstracto.68 Thus, it is not the role of the Court to 
attempt to promulgate legislative rules on what domestic law should contain in order to 
ensure that member states comply with its obligations under the Convention, including 
their obligation to comply with the decisions of the Court. On the other hand, the Courts’ 
judgments are reasoned and will contain statements which indicate why the member state 
is in breach of the Convention and, inevitably, but to a limited extent, how the member 
state needs to proceed in the future if it is going to comply with the Convention  and the 
Court’s ruling.  
 
The Court must, therefore, tread a fine line between upholding the rights in the 
Convention when finding a violation during its judicial decision-making role, and 
dictating to the member state on the content and scope of its domestic law in that area.  
Taking the example of whole life sentences, the Court has the power, and duty, to rule on 
the question of whether such sentences are compatible with Article 3 – in other words 
whether they are inhuman and degrading, either by their very nature or because of the 
manner in which they are passed or reviewed. Such a question is one of law and requires 
the interpretation of the relevant article by the European Court, who must use accepted 
principles of international human rights law in reaching its conclusions. Using that 
power, the Court and the Grand Chamber has ruled that such sentences are capable of 
being unjust and of causing the prisoner unacceptable distress and anxiety, and that this 
will constitute a violation of Article 3 unless domestic law contains a procedure whereby 
these sentences are capable of review, and, in appropriate cases, the prisoner released at a 
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stage where that they are no longer a risk to the public. Member states may, even at this 
stage, complain that the Court has abused its position and is dictating to individual states, 
who no doubt feel that such sentences, and the conditions under which they operate, 
should be decided by domestic law alone.  
 
The question, therefore, is whether it is permissible for the European Court to 
effectively prohibit certain state practices by laying down minimum rules with respect to 
the domestic law on, for example, the review of whole life sentences? The answer lies in 
the role of the principle of subsidiarity within the Convention machinery, together with 
the scope and extent of the margin of appreciation which the Court should provide to 
each member state when the Court is making its determinations. The position of 
subsidiarity is at the heart of recent debates surrounding the possible reform of the 
European Court of Human Rights,69 and Protocol No. 15 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights adds a reference to both this principle and the margin of appreciation to 
the Convention’s preamble.70 This is to highlight that the role of the European 
Convention and the Court, is secondary to the member state’s primary responsibility, 
under Article 1 of the Convention, to safeguard Convention rights.71 Hence, it is expected 
that the European Court will show due respect to the doctrine when adjudicating on cases 
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brought against member states,72 and that a dialogue should exist between both the 
European and domestic courts in the interpretation and application of such rights and the 
extent to which domestic judges have to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence.73 
 
Both subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation ensure an appropriate balance 
between the Court’s supervisory role in ensuring compliance by states with Convention 
rights, and the state’s power, and duty, to ensure that it protects those rights within its 
own jurisdiction.74 Although this doctrine applies formally to the determination of 
‘conditional’ rights – such as freedom of expression under Article 10, which can be 
limited if the restriction is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ – one can see the doctrine 
in play in the interpretation and determination of ‘absolute’  rights such as Article 3, in 
particular in the area of whole life sentences. In interpreting and applying Article 3 to a 
specific set of circumstances the Court needs to address the question whether whole life 
sentences are consistent with the Convention and Article 3, and in doing so may ask 
whether such sentences are illegal per se, or whether it is for the individual state to agree 
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whether they want to accommodate such sentences in their systems. Provided, the Court 
does not rule that such sentences are always in violation of Article 3, then a margin of 
appreciation is available to individual states as to whether they will employ them. Thus, 
the Court in Vinter made it clear that each state may decide whether to accommodate 
whole life sentences within their own criminal justice systems. Such sentences are not 
necessarily in breach of Article 3 because the Court accepts the state’s power to regard 
some crimes as worthy of a whole life term. The UK is, therefore, at liberty to provide for 
such sentences, even though many other states only pass determinate sentences.  
 
However, it is argued the right of each state to pass such sentences, and then 
monitor possible release, cannot be unrestricted if the Court is to ensure that the UK, or 
any other state, is to comply with fundamental principles of human rights law; any such 
law must comply with the basic tenets of the rule of law and of reasonableness 
(proportionality). Thus such sentences must at least be proportionate to the crime and 
reserved for the most serious offences; otherwise the sentence is in danger of being 
unjust, irrational and, of course, inhuman and degrading towards the prisoner. Each 
member state would prefer to be left entirely to its own devises as to when such sentences 
can be imposed, and indeed the Court has suggested that these matters will be determined 
by each individual state within its discretion, primarily because there will inevitably be 
initial differences of opinion as to which offences warrant a whole life term. Yet even at 
                                                                                                                                                 
74 See Kavanagh, P ‘Policing the Margins: Right Protection and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
[2006] EHRLR 422. See further, Letsas, G A theory of the Interpretation of the European Convention  
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this stage that discretion will be subject to the supervision of the European Court, to 
ensure that a state does not pass wholly unjust and inhuman sentences,75  
 
It is, of course, the issue of the review of such sentences that has caused the 
conflict between the European Court and the national authorities, with claims that the 
European Court is changing the very nature of whole life sentences together with the 
scope of domestic discretion by insisting on an element of review and clear and 
prospective rules as to that review power. But again, we can see that the Court has not 
rejected the idea of state discretion in this area; it has indeed accepted that the form of 
review (executive or judicial) may vary from state to state. Further, although it has noted 
that the common review period with member states is within 25 years of the sentence, it 
has not insisted that any review takes place within that time – again, that is left to the 
state’s discretion.  
 
With respect to the appropriate roles of the European Court and the national 
authorities in this area, it has been argued that the process of interpreting (and 
developing) the penological grounds for life incarceration, as well as well as the process 
of evaluation of their continued existence, should not be determined in the Court’s 
jurisprudence but should be left entirely to national authorities, because the latter are 
responsible for pursuing national criminal policies and must protect their societies against 
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dangerous offenders, ad that responsibility cannot be taken up by the European Court, not 
least because there are no efficient instruments.76 It is therefore accepted that the relevant 
national authorities should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing whether an 
individual life prisoner meets the criteria for release.77 On the other hand, other authors 
have called for domestic law to respond to the decision in Vinter by incorporating a right 
to rehabilitation in domestic law, and of developing a legal basis and judicial process for 
assessing prisoners’ rehabilitation.78 
 
What the European Court is insistent on, however, is that there must be a review, 
and that the rules regulating that review must be clear so as to allow the prisoner to 
determine their eligibility for review and possible release. The first requirement – the 
existence of a review process – is, admittedly a substantive restriction on the legitimacy 
of the domestic law, but is an inevitable consequence of the Court’s legal task of 
interpreting Article 3 in the light of fundamental human rights norms. The second 
requirement – that the law is clear – is, on the other hand, purely procedural and simply 
requires domestic law to comply with the basic principles of the rule of law - that the law 
should be clear and accessible. Thus, it has been noted that the Grand Chamber’s decision 
in Vinter has demonstrated that the need for a comprehensive and manifestly fair 
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procedure to evaluate progress towards release is most urgent for the persons who are 
most likely to remain in prison for the longest on grounds of punishment and 
deterrence.79 
 
This principle has in fact been applied in a recent UK High Court decision, in 
assessing whether the extradition of a person to Ghana for murder would be in violation 
of the UK’s obligations under the European Convention. In Ghana v Gambrah,80 it was 
held that there had been a violation of Article 3, and the principles established in Vinter, 
where the receiving state had agreed that the individual would not be executed in 
accordance with the law, and would be pardoned by the President, but where there was 
no legal framework for such pardon; it being simply common ground that the President 
would pardon such an individual. Thus the court found that there was no legal basis for 
allowing the prisoner to serve a sentence other than the one that was imposed for murder 
– a death sentence – and thus no material to suggest that the President would consider his 
release on the basis of the facts of the case or his personal circumstances.81 
 
Both aspects of the European Court’s judgments in cases such as Vinter are it is 
submitted entirely legitimate and consistent with its supervisory role. To ensure the 
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maintenance of the rule of law a judicial body must have the power to interpret legal 
provisions and determine their general substantive and procedural limitations. So too it 
must be able to rule on the clarity of such laws; those aspects cannot be left to 
parliamentary or executive decision. Yet, in this area those judgments are objected to by 
states who wish to have absolute discretion in deciding on the prospect of release, 
including the power not to consider release in certain cases if the executive feel that such 
release would be contrary to the public interest.  
 
The recent decision of the European Court in Hutchinson does not disturb the 
Grand Chamber’s insistence that whole life sentence must be reviewable and that 
eligibility for such review is promulgated and available at the time of the sentence. That 
decision, however, severely dilutes the requirement that the rules regulating review, and 
possible release, allow the prisoner to foresee the eligibility and possibility of such 
review. Although the majority of the Court in Hutchinson is correct in stating that the 
Court of Appeal have expressly stated that the statutory scheme of compassionate release 
can, on a human rights interpretation, cover review on grounds of rehabilitation and 
release, such a declaration does nothing to clarify the factors that an authority would or 
should take into account if and when they used that process to consider a prisoner’s 
release. Although, the Court correctly states that the interpretation of domestic law is the 
primary responsibility of the domestic authorities, such law has to possess the basic 
requirements of certainty. State law can, of course, become clearer through time and the 
process of interpretation and application, but to uphold a provision which was clearly not 
intended to cover review on grounds of rehabilitation, does little justice to the prisoner 
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who is entitled to know – at the time of the sentence - what factors will be taken into 
account in that decision, or at the very least, at what stage of the sentence the review may 
take place. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights with respect to whole life 
sentences raises a number of important issues with respect to the protection of prisoners’ 
rights, the principles of legality and proportionality, and the desirability of the European 
Court’s power to impose Convention standards on individual member states. 
 
Clear rules on review and release of whole life prisoners would raise legitimate 
expectations on behalf of the prisoner as to the period of incarceration and provide the 
domestic authorities with clear and reviewable powers of any review process. Thus, 
although the European Court is not willing to dictate the precise rules relating to review 
and release, it has stressed that Article 3 requires national authorities to be allowed to 
review whole life sentences in order to assess whether their continued detention is no 
longer be justified. Further, the prisoner is entitled to know, from the beginning of their 
sentence, what they have to do to be considered for release and under what conditions. 
The alternative is to have open ended and unclear powers of review, leaving the 
authorities with an unfettered power to consider release and leaving the prisoner in a 
state of uncertainty as to whether and on what grounds they will ever be considered for 
review and release. Unfortunately, the decision of the Court of Appeal, as affirmed by 
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the decision in Hutchinson, perpetuates that uncertainty; although technically complying 
with the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Vinter, it in effect allows the executive to decide 
whether to use a statutory power which was clearly not designed to be used to make 
rational and proportionate decisions on whether a prisoner given a whole life term should 
nevertheless be released on penological and humane grounds. This objection is borne out 
by the recent decision in Ghana v Gambrah,82 above, where it was held that the fact that 
it was common ground that the President would pardon an individual, whose death 
sentence had been unofficially commuted, was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of certainty laid down in Vinter. Although the UK regulations on compassionate release 
have some foundation in law, it is submitted that unless they are clearly applicable to 
release on grounds of rehabilitation and just punishment, they fail to meet the 
requirements of certainty laid down by the Grand Chamber and the European Court in 
this area before the unsatisfactory and pragmatic decision in Hutchinson. 
 
The objection to the European Court’s interference in this area is it is submitted 
theoretically unsound and disingenuous. The European Court is clearly prepared to enter 
into a dialogue with member states on what offences can attract whole life terms, and the 
rules on which any reviews operate. The Court is not, however, prepared to surrender its 
power to interpret the terms of the Convention or to lay down fundamental and minimum 
standards that must be applied in such cases. If the UK authorities, including the 
judiciary, fail to compromise with the European Court, then that failure will frustrate the 
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purpose of the European Convention, the fundamental role of the European Court and 
the maintenance of the rule of law. 
 
The recent judgment of the European Court in Hutchinson, however, represents a 
retrograde step in achieving justice and certainty in this area. Whatever steps the 
domestic authorities take in facilitating the review of whole life sentences, such 
provisions have to be sufficiently clear to enable the criminal justice authorities and the 
prisoner to foresee the circumstances which would trigger such a review, and for the 
judiciary to review the exercise or non-exercise of those powers. To allow a provision 
which was clearly not intended to cover the possible release of a whole life sentence 
prisoner on grounds of rehabilitation and review of their risk to the public does little 
service to the true intention of the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Vinter, or to the 
principles of certainty and legitimacy upon which convention rights are founded. 
 
At the time of writing the Grand Chamber of the European Court has accepted 
Hutchinson’s request for a referral of his case to the Grand Chamber.83 This will provide 
the Grand Chamber with an opportunity to see whether the Chamber’s decision followed 
the tenor and spirit of the Grand Chamber’s ruling in Vinter. The decision will be eagerly 
awaited by whole lifers, but equally by the government who will want to know whether 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court is prepared to interfere with UK domestic law 
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on this, and other sensitive issues involving the balance of human rights in the criminal 
justice system. 84 
 
A rejection of the case on its merits will appease the government; but if the appeal were 
to succeed the government may be prepared to resume its face off with the Court and the 
Council of Europe on the issue of subsidiarity with renewed vigour. In particular this 
would mean resurrecting and strengthening its plans to repeal the Human Rights Act 
1998 and replace it with a British Bill of Rights, which would instruct the courts to have 
less reliance on the principles and case law of the Convention.85 For the reasons 
highlighted in this article, however, it is submitted, however, that whatever the political 
and diplomatic fall out of the Grand Chamber’s decision a reversal of the Court’s 
judgment in Hutchinson is imperative for prisoners’ rights and legal certainty.  
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